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reaffirmation in Macey, the orderly development of the Babcock
process to the point of narrowing the significant contacts down
to those of domicile and insurance would be clear. Notwithstanding the above-mentioned factors of ambiguity, it appears at
least likely that, with further litigation in this area, the position
of Judges Desmond and Fuld in Dyin and that of Judge Keating
in Macey will become the controlling law and, it is contended,
there is ample basis in logic and law for considering such a
development as progressive and welcome. To the possible argument that such an approach would be as arbitrary and inflexible
as the now displaced lex loci approach, the very clear response
is that this approach negatives the arbitrariness of the latter
precisely because it involves a reasoned examination of the reason
for the choice of law, rather than merely pointing out the law
to be applied and thereby avoiding a choice in the first instance.
In a very real sense, the suggested approach indicates progress
by the mere fact that it requires a carefully weighed choice and
this is a sharp differentiation from the prior process of merely
articulating a foregone conclusion in terms of a two-word
formula.

THE PROBLEMS REGARDING THE FEDERAL TRANSFER STATUTE
-MucH ADO ABOUT NOTHING

Very often the proposed solution to a problem, upon adoption,
becomes more of a burden than the problem which it was intended
to resolve. The transfer statute set forth in the Judicial Code
[hereinafter referred to as section 1404 (a) ] enables a district
court, once jurisdiction and proper venue have been established, to
transfer any civil action to another district where it "might have
been brought" for the convenience of litigants and witnesses, or
in the interest of justice.' Enacted in 1948, it substantially replaces, in the federal courts, the common-law doctrine of forum
non conveniens 2 which provided for the dismissal, without prejudice, of an action even where the jurisdiction and venue requirements were satisfied, when it was for the convenience of the

'28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1964).

2 Forum izon conveniens still finds some life in the federal courts:
it is available when there is no alternative federal forum to which the

action may be transferred. Menendez Rodriguez v. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co.,
311 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1962). But examination of the doctrine after the
adoption of the transfer statute is without the scope of this note.
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parties and witnesses that the action be litigated in another forum. 3
While it was hailed by some as "an exciting experiment in judicial
administration," 4 several comments concerning the statute have
not been as favorable, one writer remarking that "the cure is itself
a serious disease." 5
This note will treat the history of the doctrine of forum non
conveniens and the difficulties which emanated from it and led to
the adoption of the federal transfer statute. The note will then
analyze section 1404(a) and the conflicting applications given it by
the courts.
Forum Non Conveniens
The doctrine of forum non conveniens involves a refusal by a
court to consider an action even though proper jurisdiction and
venue have been established.6 The doctrine can be found in early
Scottish cases which contained the plea of "forum competens," implying that the issue was one of lack of jurisdiction rather than
a discretionary exercise of jurisdiction.7 However, the concept
as developed in the later 1800's indicated that a court, already
having original jurisdiction, could refuse to exercise it when circumstances warranted.s The doctrine involved a consideration of
the interests of all parties and the ends to be served by justice. 9
However, there had to be a showing of real unfairness.' 0 Factors
considered by the Scottish courts were convenience of trial and
the residence of counsel or parties." Discarded as factors were:
the court's own convenience, the amount of litigation on its docket,
and the court's dislike for hearing cases in which evidence would
be given in a foreign language."2 An approach to forum non conveniens akin to that espoused by the Scottish courts was adopted
3Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
41

BARRoN

& HOLTZOFF,

FEDERAL

PkAcricE

AND

PIocamaE

§ 86.8

(Wright ed. 1960).
5Kitch,

Section 1404(a) of the Judicial Code:

In the Interest of

Justice or Injustice?, 40 INDu. L. J. 99, 101 (1965).
6Supra note 3, at 507.
7See, e.g., Macmaster v. Macmaster, [1833] 11 Sess. Gas. 685 (Scot. 2d
Div.) ; Brown's Trustees v. Palmer, [1830] 9 Sess. Cas. 224 (Scot. 2d Div.).
s Macadam v. Macadam, [1873] 11 Sess. Cas. 860 (Scot. 2d Div.);
Clements v. Macaulay, [1866] 4 Sess. Cas. 583 (Scot. 2d Div.); Longworth v. Hope, [1865] 3 Sess. Cas. 1049 (Scot. 1st Div.); Tulloch v.
Williams, [1846] 8 Sess. Cas. 657 (Scot. 1st Div.).
9La Soci6t6 du Gaz de Paris v. La Socidt6 Anonyme de Navigation
"Les Armateurs francais," [1926] Sess. Cas. 13, 16 (Scot.).
'ld. at 20.
"1Ibid.
2Id. at 21.
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in England.' 3 Thus, it is seen that in both Scotland and England
the courts weighed solely private interests in applying forum non
conveniens. This may be distinguished from the American concept
of the doctrine which not only weighed the convenience of the
individuals involved in litigation, but also4 weighed the convenience
to the public, i.e., to courts and juries.1
The phrase forum non conveniens did not find its way into
American law until 1929, when it was introduced in an article
by Paxton Blair. 15 Subsequent to the Blair article, the doctrine
found increasing use in the federal courts, to the extent that just
a few years later it was referred to by Mr. Justice Frankfurter
as "the familiar doctrine of forum non conveniens." 16 In Canada
Malting Co. v. Paterson S.S. Ltd.," the Supreme Court held that
it lay within the discretion of the district court to refuse jurisdiction over a cause of action in admiralty between foreign parties
even though the cause of an action arose within the United States.
Mandatory exercise of jurisdiction, as the universal rule, was
denied by the Court, which pointed to the occasional refusals to
exercise jurisdiction by courts of law and equity "in the interests
of justice." Is The Court stated that it was proper for the lower
court to consider, inter alia, the residence of the parties, crew
members, and witnesses, and the place of the collision in rendering
its decision. Admiralty, however, was not the sole focal point of
foruin non conveniens. Another broad area which absorbed the
impact of the doctrine was that of corporate law. In Rogers v.
Guaranty Trust Co.,'9 defendant-corporation was organized under
the laws of New Jersey, doing business there and in a number of
other states, but having its principal place of business in New York
where most of its records were kept and where its directors'
meetings were held. A minority shareholder brought suit alleging
that the employee stock subscription plan was illegal under New
Jersey statutes. The federal district court in New York dismissed
the bill, without prejudice, on the ground that New Jersey was
the proper forum. The Supreme Court, reviewing this decision,
13 For example, in Egbert v. Short, [1907] 2 Ch. 205, it was determined that service upon defendant, a domiciliary of India, while he was
casually within the country was insufficient cause to justify the choice
of an English forum considering the attendant vexation that would ensue
upon defendant, whose witnesses and evidence were in India.
'4 Supra note 3.
i5 Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American
L. REv. 1 (1929).
Law, 29 COLUMT.

16Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44, 55 (1941)
opinion).
'7285 U.S. 413 (1932).
Is Id. at 423.

19288 U.S. 123 (1933).

(dissenting
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cited Canada Malting Co. as authority, and declared that, "while
the district court had jurisdiction to adjudge the rights of the
2 0
parties, it does not follow that it was bound to exert that power."
While the Court felt that no fixed rule as to the exercise of jurisdiction in derivative actions involving the internal affairs of a
foreign corporation could be devised, it did venture to state that
convenience, efficiency, and justice would be operative factors in
such a determination. Mr. Justice Stone, dissenting, pointed to the
complexity of the proceedings and noted that, after two years of
litigation, the matter would have to be started anew. Mr. Justice
Cardozo, also dissenting, felt that since forum non conveniens is
"an instrument of justice," it should be hesitatingly applied where
"justice will be delayed, even though not thwarted altogether, if
jurisdiction is refused." 21
In certain instances, the issue, of an appropriate forum was
deemed a matter of law rather than discretion, e.g., in the case
of the special venue provisions in the Federal Employers' Liability
Act (FELA). 22 In Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Kepner,23 a FELA
action, the Supreme Court-held that a privilege of venue granted
by the legislature creating the cause of action could not be frustrated for reasons of convenience or expense. If the venue requirements were deemed unjust, the problem should be resolved
by the legislature. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, maintained
that the discretion to decline jurisdiction by applying forum wn
conveniens was deeply rooted in our law, and was indicative of a
civilized judicial system. He asserted that the result of the majority
rule would be both inequitable and unjust, imposing hardships on
one party, not necessarily for the convenience of the other party.
20 Id. at 130.
21 Id. at 151.
2236 Stat. 291

(1910), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §56 (1964). The section,
in- part, provides that "an action may be brought in a district court of
the United States, in the district of the residence of the defendant,
or in which the cause of action arose, or in which the defendant shall be
Another of
doing business at the time of commencing such action."
the statutes providing for special venue is the Sherman & Clayton Antitrust Act, 69 Stat. 282 (1955), 15 U.S.C. §22 (1964), which provides
that "any suit, action, or proceeding under the antitrust laws against
a corporation may be brought not only in the judicial district whereof
it is an inhabitant, but also in any district wherein it may be found
or transacts business. .. ."
23314 U.S. 44 (1941).
Plaintiff was injured in an accident in Ohio
where he was a resident and where the employer railroad opetated a part
of its system. He elected to sue under the FELA in a New York
district court which was 700 miles from the place of the accident The
defendant railroad applied to the state courts of Ohio for an injunction
to restrain suit in the federal court. The injunction was denied. 137 Ohio
409, 30 N.E.2d 982 (1940).
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The strongest circumstance for application of forum non conveniens, in his opinion, was "where the conveniences to be balanced
are not merely conveniences of conflicting private interests but where
there is added the controlling factor of public interest." 24
Further factors considered in a determination as to whether
forum non conveniens would be applied are to be found in Wilhiams v. Green Bay & W. R. R.25 These factors are: (1) the possibility that a suit might be vexatious or oppressive; (2) the suit
might be placed in one forum when in fairness it should be litigated
in another; (3) the relief sought against a foreign corporation
might cause such supervisional difficulties or be so extensive that the
cause could be more efficiently handled near home; and (4) the
limited geographical jurisdiction of the federal court might reduce
the effectiveness of the decree. 26 In the last analysis, reasoned
the Court, each case would turn upon its own facts. A close
examination of the "factors" suggested in Williams reveals that
most, if not all, of these are nothing more than the "factors" considered 2 in
determining whether equity will exercise its discretionary
7
powers.

A more sophisticated treatment of the criteria for the exercise
of forum non conveniens is contained in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert.2 8
There, in a negligence action, jurisdiction of the New York district
court was based on diversity of citizenship. Defendant pleaded
that jurisdiction should be declined by the federal court in New
York because of the inconvenience to a Pennsylvania corporation
and because a substantial interest of plaintiff would be served thereby. The action was dismissed. On review, the Supreme Court
held that a federal court had power to dismiss a suit pursuant
to the doctrine of forum non conveniens, and that here that power
was not abused. The Court divided the relevant factors into those
of private interest and those of public interest. Private interest
(interest of the litigant) was subdivided into: relative ease of
access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process for
attendance of unwilling witnesses; cost of obtaining attendance of
willing witnesses; possibility of a view of the premises, if appropriate; expense of trial; enforceability of a judgment; possibility
of a fair trial; and harassment, vexation and oppression of the
defendant by the plaintiff. 29 Public interest included: docket congestion; availability of juries in congested courts; trial of an action
24 Supra note 16, at 57-58.
25326 U.S. 549 (1946).
26 Id. at 554-56.
27 See CHAFE & RE, CASES AND MArmts ON EQuITY 67-165 (4th
ed. 1958).
28330 U.S. 501 (1947).
29 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, supra note 3.
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within the view and reach of affected interests where they are
multitudinous; local interest served in having local controversies
decided at the situs of their origin; and the appropriateness in
having the trial of a diversity case in a forum familiar with the law
to be applied.30 Mr. Justice Black, dissenting, sought to limit the
application of the doctrine to cases in equity or admiralty. Only
Congress, he contended, could properly authorize, by way of
statute, what the Court had done.31 He maintained that strong
arguments could be advanced against such a grant of discretionary
power to federal trial courts. For example, it could be shown by
any interstate defendant that the forum of plaintiff's choice was
inconvenient. Such power would produce ambiguity, confusion,
and hardship by cluttering the federal courts with preliminary
trials of fact as to the comparative convenience of several forums,
and by leading to numerous indistinguishable decisions from which
no positive formula for choice of forums could be derived.
Section 1404(a)-The Statute and Its Application
As Mr. Justice Black was registering his dissent in the Gilbert
case, Congress was formulating the legislation to which he and
the Court in Kepner had referred. In 1948, as part of the revision
of the Judicial Code, a subsection was added to section 1404 which
provided:
(a) For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest
of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action3 2 to any other
district or division where it might have been brought.
Section 1404(a) assumes there are at least two forums where
venue is proper and allows transfer from one forum to the other.
The broad purposes of 1404(a) are to make the federal venue
statutes more flexible in operation, and to reduce the possibility
of forum shopping. An explanation of the statute requires an
examination of cases which have construed it. In this regard, each
clause of subsection (a) shall be treated in order.

30
31

Id. at 508-09.

Id. at 515. This is in accord with the majority view in Baltimore
& O.RtR. v. Kepner, supra note 16, at 54.
3228
U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1964).
The reviser's note points to the
Kepner result as illustrative of the need for such a provision. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a), reviser's note (1966). This section should be distinguished
from section 1406(a) which provides that, where venue is improperly laid,
a court may dismiss the cause or, in the interests of justice, transfer
the action to a district where it could have been brought 28 U.S.C.
§ 1406(a) (1964).

1967 ]

NOTES

Convenience of Partiesand Witnesses in the Interest of Justice
Before the enactment of 1404(a), a heavy burden was upon
the moving party to establish inconvenience.3 3 As exemplified in
All States Freight, Inc. v. Modarelli,34 this burden was somewhat
lessened under the statute. In that case, defendant moved under
1404(a) to transfer to Ohio an action brought against him in a
New Jersey federal district court. Upon denial of the motion,
he petitioned the Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, for an order of
mandamus33 ordering the district court judge to transfer the case.
The court of appeals, while denying the petition on other grounds,
stated that the statute was quite different from the doctrine of forum
non conveniens, it was not enacted to include the stricter limitations
applicable under the common-law doctrine. In Norwood v. Kirkpatrick,36 involving three separate suits for injuries filed under
the FELA, a similar question as to the scope of section 1404(a)
was raised. On a motion to dismiss or, alternatively, to transfer
the actions to another district court, the district court judge stated
that if he had been free to construe 1404(a), he would have denied
the transfers because, in his view, the section called for an application of forum non conveniens. However, he was bound by the
decision of the Third Circuit in the Modarelli case.3 7 On review,
the Supreme Court supported the rejection in Modarelli of the
narrower doctrine of forum non conveniens. The Court felt that
Congress, in enacting the statute, "intended to permit courts to
grant transfers upon a lesser showing of inconvenience." 39 However, the Court was careful to note that this did not mean "that
the relevant factors have changed or that plaintiff's choice is not
to be considered, but only that the discretion to be exercised is
broader." "
Perhaps of more importance than the convenience of the
parties, under the federal transfer statute, is the convenience of
the witnesses. This is not so much out of compassion as it is out
of a concern for the testimony that witnesses carry with them.40
FEDERAL PRACTICE f 0.14515], at 1778 (2d ed. 1964).
34 196 F.2d 1010 (3d Cir. 1952).
35 Since an order granting or denying transfer to another forum is
deemed to be interlocutory in nature, some courts disallow immediate
appeal. While the transfer order may be appealed after final judgment,
by then the matter is usually moot. To overcome this difficulty, those
courts which do not allow an interlocutory appeal to be taken resort
to the extraordinary writ of mandamus.
See generally Note, Appealability of 1404(a) Orders: Mandamus Misapplied, 67 YALE L.J. 122 (1957).
36349 U.S. 29, 30-32 (1955).
371d. at 30.
38 Id. at 32.
39 Ibid.
40 In many cases the convenience of witnesses is not considered where
it appears that their testimony can be presented by deposition or where
33 1 MVIooax,
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Laudably, the courts usually determine the value of witnesses by a

test of quality rather than quantity.
While the federal courts have maintained that the transfer
statute allows them greater latitude in the issue of convenience than
under forum won conveniens, the factors by which convenience is
measured are apparently the same as those under the common-law
doctrine as set forth by Mr. Justice Jackson in Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Gilbert.41 The factors most often cited under 1404(a) as reasons
for transfer are: relative ease of access to sources of proof; 4 2 availability of compulsory process for unwilling witnesses and the cost
of obtaining willing witnesses ;43 and other practical considerations
which make the trial of a case expeditious and inexpensive.
The Court May Transfer
Transfer under 1404(a) may be made on motion by either
plaintiff or defendant.4
Where the defendant moves for transfer,
the courts, not disposed to disturb plaintiff's choice of forum,
will require substantial proof of a party's inconvenience. 5 Transfer,
it appears, could be effected upon the court's own motion.4 Although there is no time limit within which a transfer motion may
be made, it seems to be generally accepted that a late motion is
viewed with disfavor.4 7 For example, one court felt that, "[one]
their testimony can be given by others. See Sypert v. Miner, 266 F.2d
196 (7th Cir. 1959) (transfer allowed where court felt that expert
testimony from witness who would be inconvenienced by transfer could be
obtained from other experts in the transferee. forum). Bd see 1 BARmoN
& HoLTZo0F, FEDERAL PRAMrlCE AND PROCEDURE §86.5, at 425 (Wright
ed. 1960), where it is suggested that such a position is unsound.
41330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947).
42
E.g., Meagher v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 201 F. Supp.
113 (N.D. Ohio 1962); Grubs v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 189
F. Supp. 404 (D. Mont. 1960); Le Clair v. Shell Oil Co., 183 F. Supp.
255 (S.D. I1. 1960); Patterson v. Louisville & N.R.R, 182 F. Supp.
95 4 3(S.D. Ind. 1960).
E.g., United Artists Associated, Inc. v. N.W.L. Corp., 198 F. Supp.
953 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Ackert v. Ausman, 198 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y.
1961), inandamus denied stb nora. Ackert v. Bryan, 299 F.2d 65 (2d Cir.
1962).
44Philip Carey Mfg. Co. v. Taylor, 286 F.2d 782 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 366 U.S. 948 (1961); Roberts Bros., Inc. v. Kurtz Bros., 236
F. Supp. 471 (D.N.J. 1964); McCarley v. Foster-Milburn Co., 89 F. Supp.
643 (W.D.N.Y.), rez'd ou other grounds sub norn. Foster-Milburn Co.
v. Knight, 181 F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1950).
45 SEC v. Harwyn Publishing Corp., 232 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y.
1964); Oltman v. Currie, 231 F. Supp. 654 (E.D.S.C. 1964).
4I-T-E
Circuit Breaker Co. v. Becker, 343 F.2d 361, 363 (8th Cir.
1965).
47 Barrows v. Central Motor Lines, Inc., 192 F. Supp. 835 (N.D. Ohio
1961); Nagle v. Pennsylvania R.R., 89 F. Supp. 822 (N.D. Ohio 1950).
See generally 1 MoORE, op. cit. smpra note 33, 110.145 [4-3], at 1768-69
(2d ed. 1964).
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who seeks a change of venue must act with reasonable promptness
: * .and if he . .. delays until shortly before trial the interest of
justice in early trials overcomes any convenience to the parties
which might result from change of venue." 4 Upon granting of
the 1404(a) motion, the papers are delivered to the transferee
forum, and the transferor court loses all control of the litigation.4 9
Any Civil Action
While the doctrine of forum non conveniens applied to all
transitory actions governed by general venue statutes, it was not
applicable to local actions or to instances where venue was determined by special venue provisions. The same approach was taken
initially under 1404(a), but the Supreme Court, in a case arising
under the FELA, quickly rejected this contention, holding that the
"reach of 'any civil action' is unmistakable.

.

.

. [T]he phrase

is used without qualification, without hint that some should be
excluded." 50 Consistent with this view, the provisions of 1404(a)
have been held applicable to actions under the Declaratory Judgment Act,' the Jones Act, 2 and the Federal Tort Claims Act.5 3
Though the statute, presumably, would apply to local actions, there
would be difficulty in finding a transferee forum "where it might
have been brought."

14

Where the Action "Might Have Been Brought"
The interpretation of this limitation upon the discretionary power of transfer has been the subject of sharp disagreement. In
Foster-Milburn Co. v. Knight,5 plaintiffs, residents of California,
brought an action against defendant, a New York resident, in a
43 Nagle v. Pennsylvania RR., supra note 47. But cf. Adler v. McKee,
92 F. Supp. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), which stated that "the passage of time
itself is [not] sufficient grounds for [transfer]. .. ." Id. at 614.
49 See generally 1 BARROx & HoL-zoFF, op. cit. supra note 40, §86.1
at 410-11.
50Eo parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 58 (1949).
5' See Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-0 Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180
(1952).
52 See Wookey v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 909 (S.D.N.Y.

1950).

53 See Nowotny v. Turner, 203 F. Supp. 802 (M.D.N.C. 1962).
54See
Lettig Canning Co. v. Steckler, 188 F.2d 715 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 341 U.S. 951 (1951), an in rem action in which a motion for
transfer under 1404(a) was held properly denied since the action could be
brought only where the res was found. Compare Continental Grain Co.
v. The FBL-585, 364 U.S. 19 (1960), a case seemingly contra to Lettig.
Perhaps that opinion is distinguishable as being unique due to the admiralty
overtones of the case.
P 181 F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1950).
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federal district court in New York for a tort committed in California. The district court granted a 1404(a) motion by plaintiff
to have the action transferred to the Southern District of California.
Defendant filed a petition with the Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, for a writ of mandamus to prevent the transfer. Judge
Hand, speaking for the court, held that an action could not be
transferred on plaintiff's motion to a forum where defendant was
not amenable to process. Subsequently, the circuit court qualified
its holding by granting a defendant's motion for transfer-although
defendant had not originally been amenable to process-on a
theory of waiver. 50
However, the Court of Appeals, First Circuit, presented a
different view in In the Matter of Josephson.5 7 Petitioners, shareholders of a New Mexico corporation doing business in Massachusetts, brought a derivative suit in a Massachusetts federal district
court, naming as defendants the corporation and three directors
domiciled in Massachusetts. The court granted defendants' motion
under 1404(a) for transfer of the case to the New Mexico district
court, where venue was also proper, but where the directors were
not amenable to process. Petitioners sought mandamus, contending
that the transfer was not authorized under 1404(a) because New
Mexico was not a district in which the action "might have been
brought." The Court of Appeals in denying the writ, referred to the
test of Foster as "gloss . . . put upon the language of 1404(a)." 58
They upheld the transfer on the ground that the words "might
have been brought" refer only to venue and do not require, even
in the absence of waiver, that a defendant who has been served
in the transferor forum be amenable to process in the transferee
forum.59 Under this interpretation, a plaintiff, as well as a defendant, may move to transfer an action to a district in which
defendant could not have been served, provided venue was proper.
The Supreme Court, in Hoffman v. Blaski60 construed another
aspect of the phrase "might have been brought." There the plaintiffs served process and brought action in a Texas federal district
56

Anthony v. Kaufman,

342 U.S. 955 (1952).

193 F.2d 85

(2d Cir. 1951),

cert. denied,

The Foster decision was followed by the Ninth

Circuit and numerous federal district courts. See Shapiro v. Bonanza
Hotel Co., 185 F.2d 777, 780-81 (9th Cir. 1950); see, e.g., Ragsdale v.
Price, 185 F. Supp. 263 (M.D. Tenn. 1960); Bunker v. Armstrong, 184
F. Supp. 472 (D. Minn. 1960); Mitchell v. Gundlack, 136 F. Supp. 169
(D. Md. 1955); United States v. Reed, 104 F. Supp. 260 (E.D. Ark. 1952).
57218 F.2d 174 (1st Cir. 1954).
5s In the Matter of Josephson, 218 F.2d 174, 185 (1st Cir. 1954).
5 Id. at 184-85.
60363 U.S. 335 (1960) (includes Sullivan v. Behlner, treated together
with Blaski in the majority opinion; however, Mr. Justice Frankfurter
wrote a separate dissent for each case).
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court which had jurisdiction and in which venue was proper. Defendants moved for transfer under 1404(a) to an Illinois district
court alleging "convenience" and "interest of justice." The defendants, admitting that an action brought originally in the transferee forum would have been dismissed for lack of venue, asserted
that the phrase "might have been brought" should be construed as
meaning proper venue at the time of the transfer. Therefore, defendants' waiver of venue enabled the transferee forum to be a
place where the action "might then have been brought." 61 After
the district court granted the order, plaintiffs petitioned for mandamus to vacate the order, but the Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit,
denied the writ. Upon the receipt of the papers by an Illinois
federal district court, plaintiffs moved for a transfer back to the
Texas federal district court. After denying the motion, the Court
of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, reversed and remanded the actions
to the transferor forum. On certiorari, the Supreme Court held
that a forum is one where the action "might have been brought"
only if the plaintiff could have brought the action there originally,
independently of the subsequent actions by the defendant. Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, in dissent, observed that while the Court had
disposed of one problem as respected 1404(a), it left unresolved
a problem of judicial administration since the Court permitted
different circuits to review the issue of transfer.
In an attempt to ward off further conflict arising from the
phrase "might have been brought," the Supreme Court, in 1964,
heard Van Dusen v. Barrack.62 The personal representatives of
Pennsylvania residents who died as a result of a Massachusetts
plane crash brought suit in a Pennsylvania district court against
the airline and several manufacturers. The defendants moved
to transfer the action to a district court in Massachusetts, where
venue and personal jurisdiction would also have been proper. The
district court granted the motion and the plaintiffs sought mandamus to restrain the transfer. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that the capacity of representatives to sue is to be
determined by the law of the state in which the district court
sits. 3 Thus, on the ground that the plaintiffs had not qualified
under Massachusetts law to sue as personal representatives in that
state, the Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, concluded that the action
61 Id. at 342.
For a thorough discussion of the background
of Van Dusen v. Barrack, see generally Kitch, Section 1404(a) of the
Judicial Code: In the Interest of Justice or Injustice?, 40 IND. L.J.
99 (1965).
6 FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b) provides: "The capacity of . . . a repre62376 U.S. 612 (1964).

sentative . . . to sue or be sued shall be determined by the law of the
"
state in which the district court is held ..
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could not "have been brought" in Massachusetts and directed the
district court to vacate its order for transfer. The Supreme Court,
on certiorari, reversed unanimously, holding that the final phrase
of 1404(a) referred solely to the federal rules of venue and personal
jurisdiction, and not to any laws of the transferee state. Characterizing 1404(a) as a federal judicial housekeeping measure that
merely effected a "change in the courtrooms," Mr. Justice Goldberg declared that the transferee forum must apply "these . . . laws

of the transferor State which would significantly affect the outcome
of the case." 64 The Court distinguished Blaski, stating that in
Van Dusen both venue and personal jurisdiction were proper 'in
Massachusetts. The Court believed that the only issue was whether
1404(a) referred also to state rules that might further restrict
the availability of convenient federal forums. Noting that the statute
is found in the part of the Judicial Code dealing with "Jurisdiction and Venue," it concluded that the statutory context was "persuasive evidence" that the final phrase of 1404(a) refers only to
federal limitations.
Problems Arising Under the Transfer Statute
An examination of these cases indicates that 1404(a) has not
proved in practice to be the panacea it was hoped to be in theory.
Witness of this fact is the tortuous path of Hoffman v. Blaski to
the Supreme Court. 65 Mr. Justice Stewart there remarked: "from
the point of view of efficient judicial administration the . . . history of this litigation is no subject for applause." '6 The administrative problems which concern 1404(a) lie in the area of procedure for transfer and appeal. As shown in the Blaski case,
needless delay may result from determinations by different district
courts on one issue of transfer. This problem may be termed as
one of a horizontal nature, that is, it involves expeditiousness of
litigation where coordinate courts are involved. The decision in
Blaski represents only a partial solution to the horizontal problem,
foreclosing the possibility of forum shopping on the, part of the
defendant. Other aspects of the problem of transfer procedure
remain unsolved.
Problems vertical in nature are those dealing with reviewability of 1404(a) orders. Review may be obtained in two ways;
through the Interlocutory Appeals ActG7 or by petitioning for a
writ of mandamus.
"4Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 639 (1964).
65 See Kitch, supra note 62.
66 Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 345 (1960) (concurring opinion).
6728 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1964).
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There is disagreement among the circuits as to whether the
Interlocutory Appeals Act is available to one seeking review of a
transfer order. At this point, the majority of circuits deciding the
issue have held that interlocutory review is not available.6 S Consequently, losing parties have, almost uniformly, sought relief by
petitioning for writs of mandamus. In response, the circuit courts
have heard the petitions with increasing frequency, aware of the
need for a consistent body of law in view of the vague language
of the statute. The result has been a confused and inadequate
body of law, with the courts of appeals disagreeing among themselves even as to when mandamus should be available. 69 The net
effect of these petitions is to delay litigation. In the words of Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, the consequence is "that a question once
decided has been reopened, with all the wasted motion, delay
and expense which that normally entails." 70
Solutions and Alternatives
Writers have suggested that the solution to the difficulties
raised by the Foster-Milburn and Blaski cases is to delete the
phrase "where it might have been brought. '71 This would
presumably solve the problems previously discussed. District court
judges would be free to determine without qualification exactly
what forum would be, justice considered, most convenient for
the parties and witnesses. In regard to the appealability of
transfer orders, it has been suggested that by denying mandamus
the delays and additional litigation now suffered would be
eliminated.7 2 In contrast, it has been implied that by laying
down general standards to determine the availability of manthe propriety of a transfer order
damus, the burden of deciding
73
would be greatly relieved.
To alleviate much of the confusion in regard to the applicable
standards utilized in determining transfer, it has been suggested
that these principles and criteria be codified to whatever extent
6sAt present, the Second, Third, and Sixth Circuits disallow the use
of § 1292 in a transfer case, holding that mandamus is the proper method
by which review may be secured. See Olnick & Sons v. Demster Bros.,
365 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1966); Standard v. Stoll Packing Corp., 315 F.2d
626 (3d Cir. 1963); Bufalino v. Kennedy, 273 F.2d 71 (6th Cir. 1959).
In contrast, the fifth circuit has maintained that interlocutory appeal
rather than mandamus is the mode of review from a transfer order.
69 See 1 BARRox

& HoLrzoFF, FEDEAL PRActicE & PRocEDuRE §86.7

(Wright ed. 1960).
7
0Supra note 66, at 347-48 (dissenting opinion).
71 See WRIGHT, THE FEDERAL COURTS 146 (1963).
72 See op. cit. supra note 69, § 86.8 at 442.
73 Kitch, s ipra note 62, at 141.
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possible. 4 However, an opposing view suggests that the decisions
on transfer should be left to the sound discretion of the trial
court on a case-by-case basis, instead of regulating transfers
by a rigid rule.7 5 A third view would place the fault for problems
concerning the statute upon the lack of realism on the part of
courts in deciding whether to grant a transfer under 1404(a) .7
The most extreme solution offered to solve the problems
encountered in the operation of 1404(a) has been to dispose
of the statute altogether. 77 It is felt that the statute, realistically,
can be of help only in a few "hardship" cases. And upon
weighing this slight benefit against the burdens of confusion,
congestion and delay that the statute seems to carry with it,
it is reasoned that it would be easier to bear the few instances
of hardship, than to continue under the statute.
Conclusion
While deletion of the final limiting phrase of 14 0 4(a) might
allow for a selection of the most convenient forum, it is maintained that it would do so at the expense of a statutory guideline. While it can be argued that case law would more flexibly
fill in the qualifications now supplied by the statute's final phrase,
this argument could be effectively rebutted by pointing to the
morass of confused case law extant concerning the statute. It is
hard to see how this one modification of the statute, taken alone,
would allow the courts to rectify what they have failed to do
in the past. Assuming that the deletion of the words "might
have been brought" would provide a workable solution to the
conflicts arising as to 1404(a), the deletion would be successful
only if it were accomplished in conjunction with an addition
to the statute somewhat akin to section 1292, providing for
some mode of interlocutory review of the transfer order. In
this way, perhaps a cogent body of case law could develop
around the statute. It should be noted, however, that while
this solution might prove workable, it would be susceptible to
delay. Therefore, this solution is, at best, only a fair alternative. To disallow any review of the trial court decision, while
it might provide for rapid disposition of a transfer motion, would
neither be just nor judicially sound. Where there are now
several conflicting views as to the standards that will necessitate

U See Kaufman, Observations on Trnwsfer Under §1404(a) of the New
Judicial Code, 10 F.R.D. 595 (1951).

75 See op. cit. supra note 69, §86.8, at 441-42.
76 Id. § 86.8 at 441; op. cit. supra note 71, at 145.
77 Kitch, supra note 62, at 141-42.
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a transfer under 1404(a), lack of appellate review would allow
even greater variation.
Notably, the Supreme Court, since the enactment of 1404(a),
either has spoken in general terms concerning the statute or has
dealt narrowly with only one aspect of it. This allows the
argument to be raised that a comprehensive construction of the
statute by the Court is in order. It is unlikely that this will
happen. First, the subject matter of the statute, being essentially
concerned with factual issues of convenience, does not lend itself
to far-ranging judicial interpretation. Second, the Court would
not be dealing, as in the case of forum non conveniens, -with a:
judicial doctrine but, rather, with a congressional measure. For
this reason, it will be apprehensive of broadly interpreting aspects
of the statute not factually presented to it.
Perhaps the chore of further defining the transfer provision
best rests with Congress, its author. Congress has the resources
to analyze the feedback from the multitudinous factual determinations in cases under 1404(a), and can most effectively synthesize
it into a more detailed definition of the statute. Further, since
Congress originally formulated the measure, it is in the best
position to expound upon it. It may be argued that a more
detailed codification of the factors which determine transfer
might prevent the courts in the future from handling with some
degree of flexibility new problems which may arise.
It is suggested that the need for judicial flexibility, in this
instance, does not outweigh the need of the nisi prius federal
courts to decide transfer motions before them quickly and
uniformly. The issue of forum, perhaps once of great practical
significance, today involves essentially no more than a matter
of convenience, since the trend todav is towards a more uniform
legal system throughout the country. Considering modern methods
of travel, even convenience as an important factor in the choice
of one forum over another seems to diminish. In the great
majority of cases, then, it would seem that the choice of forum
involves mostly a question of who is to bear the burden of
transportation to the trial court. If the problem may be thus
reduced, is not the entire discussion as to 1404(a) "much ado
about nothing"?

